Abstract-Broadcast signcryption, which enables the broadcaster to simultaneously encrypt and sign the content meant for a specific set of users in a single logical step, provides the most efficient solution to this dual problem of confidentiality and authentication. Recently, several identity-based broadcast signcryption (IBBSC) schemes have been proposed. However, we find almost all IBBSC schemes that have been proposed until now do not satisfy register secrecy and forward secrecy. Following this, we propose a new IBBSC scheme and formally prove its security under the random oracle model for broadcast signcryption (IND-CCA2 and EUF-CMA) While we propose a secure IBBSC scheme, we do not compromise the performance. The proposed scheme only requires two pairing operations for end user devices with limited computing capability.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of public key signcryption schemes was proposed by Zheng in 1997 [1] . The purpose of this kind of primitive is to perform encryption and signature in a single logical step in order to obtain confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation more efficiently than the sign-then-encrypt approach. The drawback of this latter solution is to expand the final ciphertext size and increase the sender and receiver's computing time. In Zheng's approach, the public key of a signer is essentially a random string selected from a given set. Therefore, it is infeasible to prove that a party is indeed the sender for a given signcryption message. This problem can be solved via a certificate which provides an unforgeable and trusted link between the public key and the identity of the signer by the CA's signature. And there is a hierarchical framework that is called a public key infrastructure (PKI) to issue and manage certificates. However, this system requires a large amount of computing time and storage when the number of users increases rapidly. To simplify key management procedures of conventional PKIs, Shamir [2] introduced the concept of Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC) in 1984, but a satisfying identity based encryption scheme (IBE) only appeared in 2001. It was designed by Boneh and Franklin [3] and cleverly uses bilinear maps (the Weil or Tate pairing) over supersingular elliptic curves. Subsequently, several ID-based signcryption schemes were proposed [4, 5, 6] . The main practical benefit of IBC is in greatly reducing the need for, and reliance on, the public key certificates.
Broadcast signcryption, which enables the broadcaster to simultaneously encrypt and sign the content meant for a specific set of users in a single logical step, provides the most efficient solution to this dual problem of confidentiality and authentication. In 2004, Bohio et al. [7] proposed an authenticated broadcasting scheme for wireless ad-hoc networks and Mu et al. [8] proposed Identity-based authenticated broadcast encryption and distributed authenticated encryption, which achieve the same security goals as broadcast signcryption and hence, their schemes are also a broadcast signcryption scheme. The term broadcast signcryption was coined much later by Fagen Li et al. [9] , but Zhang and Geng [10] showed that their scheme cannot be against outside attack and inside attack. In [11, 12, 13] , Selvi et al. separately pointed out that in [7, 8, 9] schemes are insecure and they proposed secure schemes. For the scheme [11] , every subscriber obtains the same session key from the broadcaster, if one of the subscribers wants to unregister from the broadcaster, the broadcaster needs to re-change and redistribute the session key for the other subscribers. Recently, [14] and [15] proposed an efficient identitybased broadcast signcryption scheme respectively, their schemes have constant size ciphertext for the broadcaster, but the broadcaster needs to transmit the identity information of designated receivers, and the public key generated and delivered by the PKG is of size linear in the maximal value of the set of receivers, for the receiver IDi the cost of multiplication and exponentiation operations depends on number of receivers, that computation overheads is too high for a user, thus their schemes do not apply to the end user with limited computing capability. Moreover, the schemes all above do not satisfy the register secrecy and forward secrecy security attributes.
In this paper, we propose an identity-based broadcast signcryption scheme, and formally prove its security (confidentiality and unforgeability) under the strongest existing security models for broadcast signcryption (IND-CCA2 and EUF-CMA respectively). Compared with other broadcast signcryption schemes regarding the security and computation overheads, we believe that our scheme is more efficient and more suitable for broadcast system devices with low computational capabilities. Our scheme has the following merits: (1) one subscriber can securely register and unregister from a broadcaster without affecting the other subscribers; (2) the scheme satisfies the forward secrecy attribute.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The preliminaries for bilinear pairings and security definitions are given in the next section. The formal models of identity-based broadcast signcryption are described in Section 3. Section 4 describes a concrete identity-based broadcast signcryption scheme. The security analysis and discussions of the proposed scheme are presented in Section 5. In Section 6, the performance comparison among the proposed scheme and the recently proposed schemes is presented. Section 7 gives our conclusion and the future work of this research.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, the mathematical preliminaries required to understand the identity-based broadcast signcryption scheme presented in the section IV are introduced. Using the notation of the first encryption scheme using bilinear pairings proposed by Boneh & Franklin [3] , let G 1 be an additive group of prime order q and G 2 be a multiplicative group of the same order q. Assume the existence of a mapê from G 1 ×G 1 to G 2 . Typically, G 1 will be a subgroup of the group of points on an elliptic curve over a finite field, G 2 will be a subgroup of the multiplicative group of a related finite field and the mapê will be derived from either the Weil or Tate pairing on the elliptic curve. The mappingê must be efficiently computable and has the following properties.
1)
Bilinearity:
Non-degeneracy: There exists P and Q∈ G 1 such
Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute ê (P, Q) for all P, Q∈ G 1 The security of our scheme described here relies on the hardness of the following problems. 
III. FORMAL MODELS OF IDENTITY-BASED BROADCAST SIGNCRYPTION
In the section, we present the generic model and security model of identity-based broadcast signcryption. In our models, there are three types of entities: broadcaster; users who want to subscribe or register to the broadcaster; trusted authority called the Private Key Generator (PKG).
A. Generic Model
The model of identity-based broadcast signcryption consists of the following four algorithms: Setup: On input of a security parameter k the PKG uses this algorithm to produce its master public/private key pair (P pub , s). It also outputs some params which are the global public parameters for the system. 
B. Security Model
The two basic security properties that are desired out of any IBBSC scheme are message confidentiality and unforgeability. We formally extend the existing strongest security notions for encryption and digital signature (IND-CCA2 and EUF-CMA respectively) to IBBSC below. 
Definition 4 (Message Confidentiality
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME Our scheme consists of the following concrete algorithms: Setup: Suppose G 1 is an additive cyclic group of prime order q, and G 2 is a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order. Suppose P is a generator of G 1 . There exists a bilinear pairing mapê from G 1 ×G 1 to G 2 and cryptographic hash functions 1. In the user authentication phase, user A follows the steps below.
(a) Choose one random nonce r∈
In the broadcaster recordation phase, broadcaster B follows the steps below. A. Basic security Theorem 1. In the random oracle model, our identitybased broadcast signcryption scheme is secure against any IND-IBBSC-CCA2 adversary A if BIDHP is hard.
Proof. Let P be the generator of G 1 .We assume the challenger C receives a random instance (P, aP, bP) of the Bilinear Inverse Diffie-Hellman Problem. His goal is to compute of the users whom he proposes to attack, and the identity ID B of the broadcaster who signcrypts the message to these users. Then, C gives A the system parameters. for use in the next step. A then performs a second series of queries which is treated in the same way as the first one. At the end of the simulation, he produces a bit b' for which he believes that the challenge signcryption is the signcryption of m b' from ID B to its subscribers. At this moment, if b = b', C then answers 1 the answer to the BIDHP. Otherwise, it outputs 0. Since the adversary is denied access to the Unsigncrypt oracle with the challenge signcryption, he can recognize which message was signcrypted by seeing the signcryption alone, only if he has computed U, for which he must have computed the value of zi for some user ID i ∈ Φ who subscribes to the broadcaster B. This means, the zi that he computes must be the same as the zi that was used in the construction of the subscriber polynomial. We have,
Retrieve the tuple (ID B-j , h i , w, Q B-j , -
there exists a non-trivial adversary A who can defeat the signcryption by learning something about the encrypted message, that means there exists an algorithm to solve the BIDHP with non-negligible advantage. Since this is not possible, no adversary can defeat the signcryption this way. Hence, our proposed scheme is secure against any IND-IBBSC-CCA2 adversary A attack.
Theorem 2 (Unforgeability).
In the random oracle model, our identity-based broadcast signcryption scheme is secure against any EUF-IBBSC-CMA adversary A if Inv-CDHP is hard in G 1 .
Proof. Let P be the generator of G 1 .We assume the distinguisher C receives a random instance (P, aP) of Inverse Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem. His goal is to compute a 
we can see that the challenger C has the same advantage in solving the Inv-CDHP as the adversary A has in forging a valid signcryption. So, if there exists an adversary who can forge a valid signcryption with nonnegligible advantage, that means there exists an algorithm to solve the Inv-CDHP with non-negligible advantage. Since this is not possible, no adversary can forge a valid signcryption with non-negligible advantage. Hence, our proposed scheme is secure against any EUF-IBBSC-CMA adversary A attack.
B. Further security considerations
In this section we will heuristically argue that the identity-based broadcast signcryption scheme satisfies the following security properties. 
VI. PROTOCOL COMPARISON
In this section, we compare the efficiency of our scheme with other schemes appearing in the literature in Table 1 regarding the security and computation overheads not including precomputation overheads required by different phases including registration phase, signcryption phase and unsigncryption phase.
We use the following notations to analyze the computational complexity for our scheme and some existing previous schemes.
ü t a is the time for addition of two elements in the additive group < G 1 ,+ >. ü t m is the time for point scalar multiplication on the additive group < G 1 ,+ >. ü t g is the time for x∈ * q Z times multiplication in the multiplicative group < G 2 ,× >. ü t e is the time for bilinear pairing operation. ü t is the number of subscribers.
ü Y and N denote that the property holds and does not hold in the scheme respectively. As we all know, a bilinear pairing operation is very time-consuming than other operations [3] . Table 1 summarizes the performance result of the proposed scheme in terms of the computational costs for the registration phase, sigcryption phase and unsigcryption phase, respectively.
As shown in the Table 1 , our scheme is more efficient than that of [12, 13] in terms of the security and computational costs of sigcryption phase and unsigcryption phase, and our scheme only requires two bilinear pairing operations in registration phase. Hence, consider the broadcast system devices with limited computing capability and communication security it may be that our identity-based broadcast signcryption scheme is more applicable.
Ⅶ. CONCLUSIONS
Broadcast encryption is useful for distributing digital contents to Internet users over a broadcast channel. It allows a center to deliver the encrypted data to a large set of users so that only a particular subset of privileged users can decrypt it. However, we find almost all IBBSC schemes that have been proposed until now do not satisfy register secrecy and forward secrecy. Following this, we have proposed a fixed version of the scheme to achieve register secrecy and forward secrecy attributes, also we have proven its IND-CCA2 and EUF-CMA security formally in the random oracle model. These are the strongest security notions for message confidentiality and authentication respectively. While we have proposed a secure IBBSC scheme, we have not compromised the performance. In fact, the proposed scheme only requires two pairing operations for end user devices with limited computing capability.
In the future, we will consider the influences of the number of privileged users on the size of the signcryption and the computation overheads on the broadcaster side. Another aspect of future work is further reducing the number of pairing computations during designcryption on the subscriber side. Besides, it is unrealistic to assume that a single trusted authority will be responsible for issuing secret keys to members of a large-scale network. Therefore, we will consider multiple domains environment where a subscriber can register to another domain broadcaster. 
